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Summary findings
Barr and Oduro look at earnings differentials between  earn much more than the relatively low-earning Asante,
members of different ethnic groups and between  Fante, and Ewe.
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ethnic group, and other workers in Ghana's  groups, although there is evidence of discrimination in
manufacturing sector.  favor of inexperienced workers from the same ethnic
They find that a significant proportion  of the earnings  group, who can be assessed and matched with jobs more
differentials identified between ethnic groups can be  easily than similar workers from other ethnic groups.
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observations about workers'  characteristics. Labor  earn a considerable premium, possibly because they
market segregation along ethnic lines-combined  with  contribute more to productivity than their fellow
considerable variation in employers' characteristics  workers (perhaps through  an effect on esprit de corps).
(especially educational attainment  and family  The authors'  results draw attention  to some startling
background, possibly because of discrimination in other  differences in educational and labor market attainment
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differentials.  such issues in the policy debate.
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1. Introduction
Discussions about economic policy between international  organisations  and African
governments  rarely  touch upon issues  relating  to ethnicity.  And yet recent contributions
to the literature on cross-country  differences in economic performance  indicate that
ethnic diversity  is associated  with very high economic  costs, in terms of lower rates of
economic  growth  due to the adoption  of dysfunctional  macroeconomic  policies (Easterly
and Levine (1997)) and lower levels of trust and weak norms of civic cooperation
(Knack  and Keefer  (1997)),  and increased  probabilities  of civil war (Collier and Hoeffier
(1998)).' Given these findings, surely the time has come to place the economics of
ethnicity  on the agenda  for policy  debate.
The two most commonly  raised arguments  against  placing ethnic issues on this agenda
are that ethnic diversity is pre-determined  and cannot be manipulated by economic
policy  and that ethnic issues  are politically  sensitive. 2 With respect  to the first of these,
we suggest  that, while levels of ethnic diversity  cannot  be changed,  there may be ways
of changing  their effect on economic  outcomes.  A necessary  prerequisite  for identifying
policy interventions  that might achieve  this objective  is a deeper understanding  of the
role and effects of ethnic diversity  at the micro-level.  We need to know how and why
ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries  affect the economic  decisions  that people make
during their everyday  lives. Through  such an investigation  we may be able to identify
the conditions under which the negative effects of  ethnic diversity on  economic
outcomes  might be minimised.  In addition  and with respect  to the second argument,  by
increasing  our understanding  of why ethnicity  matters  and, wherever  possible,  linking  it
to rational  choice,  we may start  to depoliticise  the topic.
' Easterly  and Levine  (1996) and Collier  and Hoeffler  (1998)  use an index  of ethnolinguistic  fractionalization,  defined
as the probability  of two randomly  drawn individuals  for the same country  belonging  to different  ethnic groups,  Knack
and Keefer (1997)  use a measure  of ethnic  homogeneity,  defined  as the proportion  of the population  belonging  to the
largest  ethnic  group.
2  Ethnicity became an important  political issue in Africa after independence,  as pressure grew for the new leaders
to create opportunities  for indigenous  capital, mediate between  conflicting  ethnic claims on public resources,  and
enable lagging groups to catch up to those that had secured early economic advantages (Apter (1965), Cohen
(1969), Bates (1974), Rothchild and Oluonsola  (1983)). Around this time a number of African  countries including
Ghana attempted  to promote indigenous  African business by introducing  regulations that pressured Lebanese and
Indian  entrepreneurs  to vacate trading and small-scale  services  (leaving  these for African entrepreneurs)  and move
3The following  analysis  contributes  to this effort by investigating  the effects of ethnic
identity and  ethnic  boundaries on  labour  market  outcomes in  the  Ghanaian
manufacturing  sector. The analysis draws from the literature on the economics of
discrimination witiin  labour markets. This  literature, with  its  strong empirical
component,  provides  us with a well developed  conceptual  framework  and a set of tools
for identifying,  categorising,  and quantifying  the effects of Ghana's ethnic diversity  on
manufacturing  workers' earnings.  However,  this literature focuses almost exclusively
on discrimination  against black relative to white workers and women relative to men
in OECD labour markets. While most of the models proposed do not rule out the
possibility that employers may come from 'disadvantaged' as well as 'advantaged'
groups, throughout  the literature and especially its empirical dimension, there is an
implicit assumption  that employers  are predominantly  white and male, i.e., from the
advantaged group. In the Ghanaian context it would be  entirely inappropriate to
assume that employers come predominantly  from one ethnic group. Indeed, our data
from the manufacturing sector indicates that the distributions of  employers and
employees  across ethnic groups  are very similar. Thus, in our investigation  we need to
take  account  both  of  discrimination between different  ethnic  groups  and  of
discrimination between own and other ethnic groups. 3 In each case our objective,
wherever possible, is to  identify and discern between taste-based discrimination,
statistical  discrimination,  and discriminatory  outcomes  that are due to networking  and
other factors.
The paper has six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 contains a brief
review of the literature  on labour  market discrimination.  Then, in Section 3 we set out
our methodology  for identifying  and testing various hypotheses about the origins of
ethnic earnings differentials in the Ghanaian manufacturing  sector. In Section 4 we
describe our data. We present our results in Section 5 and in Section 6 we draw our
conclusions.
2. Review  of the Literature  on Labour  Market  Discrimination
their capital into manufacturing.  More recently  democratisation  has often been accompanied  by an increase in the
politicisation  of ethnicity (Glickman  (1995)).
3Collier and Garg  (1999) find evidence  of discrimination  in favour of the dominant kin group in the Ghanaian
public sector.
4Following Altonji and Blank (1999) we define labour market discrimination as 'a
situation in which persons who provide labour market services and who are equally
productive in a physical  or material sense are treated  unequally  in a way that is related
to ... ethnicity' (p. 3168). Further,  we endeavour  to distinguish  between current  labour
market discrimination,  given predetermined  worker characteristics,  and the effects of
prior discrimination  on those characteristics.  Such pre-market  discrimination  can take
two forms. First, discrimination may occur in other markets. So, for example, the
quality of the schooling that is accessible to different groups may vary (O'Neill
(1990), Maxwell (1994) and Neal and Johnson (1996)). Second, past labour market
discrimination  may affect current labour market outcomes  to the extent that it affects
how workers from different groups prepare for entry into the labour market. So, for
example,  it may affect their chosen level of investment  in human capital (Loury (1977,
1981),  Durlauf (1992),  Benabou  (1994, 1996),  Lundberg  and Startz (1998)).
Discrimination  can be motivated  in several  ways.  Becker (1971) focused on the effects
of a taste for discrimination.  In his model discriminating  employers  behave as if the
price associated  with hiring a worker from the less favoured group is their wage plus
an additional amount which he calls the 'coefficient of discrimination'. As a result,
workers  are segregated  with those from the less favoured  group being  hired by the less
prejudiced employers and suffering a wage differential that is determined by the
preferences  of their most prejudiced  employer.  Further, discriminating  employers  earn
lower profits, so with free entry  the effects of discrimination  on earnings  disappear in
the long run. In the US and Europe this has not happened. A similar and similarly
problematic  prediction derives from Becker's (1971) model in which the employers'
disutility is associated with placing the less favoured group in a certain occupation
with occupational segregation  and a short run earnings differential as the outcome. 4
However, Coate  and Loury  (1993a) present an  alternative model in  which all
employers  have the same preferences,  thereby removing  the tendency for the earnings
gap to  disappear in  the long run. This tendency can also be  eliminated by the
introducing  imperfect information  in the form of search costs and thereby rendering
segregation  costly (Borjas and Bronars (1989), Black (1995), Bowlus and Eckstein
(1998)). These models do not predict segregation  unless it is the employers and not
the workers  who are conducting  the search  (Bowlus  and Eckstein (1998)).
4 Becker (1971) also presents models of employee  and consumer  discrimination.
5In the Ghanaian  context a taste for discrimination  could lead to a premium for workers
employed  by members of their own ethnic group. However, given that no particular
group dominates the role of employer,  we do not expect discrimination  motivated by
taste  to  lead  directly to  a  wage  premium  for  any  particular  group. 5 This
notwithstanding,  to the extent that (1) a taste for discrimination  in favour of co-ethnics
leads to  segregation and (2) discrimination in  credit and other markets leads to
variations  in the labour  demand curves of different  types of employer,  we may observe
earnings  differentials  between  groups.
Imperfect information also  provides the  foundations for  models  of  statistical
discrimination.  Building on the pioneering work of Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973)
this literature  explores  the consequences  of firms having  limited information  about  the
skills and reliability of job applicants, especially  young and inexperienced  ones, and
therefore using correlated and easily observable characteristics  such as ethnicity to
discriminate between them; One particular finding in this literature is that, due to
feedback  via, for example,  investments  in human capital, biased stereotypes  might be
self confirming (Arrow (1973), Coate and Loury (1993b)). In the Ghanaian context
statistical discrimination  of this form could be leading to both current labour market
discrimination and feedback effects and consequent earnings differentials between
members of different  ethnic groups.
Another form of statistical discrimination  may affect the earnings of co-ethnic and
related  workers.  Aigner and Cain (1977)  and subsequently  Lundberg  and Startz (1983)
and Lundberg  (1991) have explored  the effects  of group differences  in the precision of
the  information that  employers have  about individual productivity when  that
productivity depends on the quality of the match between worker skills and the
requirements  of the job. Those groups  for which more precise information  is available
will earn a premium. However, if employers  learn as workers gain more exposure to
the market and if there is no underlying  difference in productivity,  the premium will
be eroded by worker experience.  In the literature this form of discrimination  may also
lead to ex post  differences  in productivity  across  groups.  However, this does not apply
in our context where the favoured workers are defined by their sameness to their
employers  rather than by some dimension  of individual  identity.
5 To the extent that all employers,  regardless of their own ethnicity prefer to employ any particular ethnic group it
is more likely to be due to some  form of statistical  discrimination.
6There is a close conceptual  link between this work on statistical discrimination  and
Montgomery's (1991) work on  the effect of  social networks on  labour market
outcomes. In both cases some dimension of social structure is associated with a
variation in the amount or accuracy  of the information  available to employers  about
prospective employees and  vice  versa.  In  the  former, the  agents have  better
information  about others with whom they share a particular aspect of social identity
which may be linked to language, culture, or some other determinant  of cognition. In
the latter, agents have better information  about others with whom they share a social
connection. Building  on  Granovetter  (1973)  and  Rees  and  Schultz  (1970),
Montgomery (1991) shows that, if social networks are important for this reason,
'workers who are well connected  might fare better than poorly connected  workers (p.
1408)'.  Arrow (1998) makes the  connection between this  literature and  racial
discrimination.  He cites Kranton and Minehart (1997), who show that a sufficiently
dense network will mimic a perfect market, and argues that evidence of statistical
discrimination  should be viewed as evidence that networks are both important and
imperfect  in the sense  that they are not sufficiently  dense.
3. Methodology
3.1 Investigating  the variations  in earnings  between  ethnic  groups
Given a sample of workers, the extent of the variation in earnings between ethnic
groups  can be established  by estimating  the following  equation:-
lnwi = aO + axle, +  i(1)
where Inwi  is the log of earningsfor  worker i, ao is a constant term ei is a vector of
dummies,  one corresponding  to each ethnic group represented  in the sample, a, is the
vector of coefficients  associated  with those ethnic dummies, and &,1  is the error term.
The  joint significance  of al tells us whether  there is variation  across the ethnic groups,
the sign and significance  of specific elements  of a,  tells us whether particular  groups
eam significantly  more or less than the group chosen as a basis for comparison,  and
the signs and significance  of differences  between the elements of a,  provide us with
similar information  about other pairwise  comparisons.
7In an effort to establish how much of the identified earnings differentials  are due to
variations in predetermined  personal characteristics,  we then add a vector of worker
personal  characteristics,  xi, to the function
lnw,  =  aO  + alei + a2Xi  + 42i.  (2)
Further,  to  investigate whether  the  returns  associated  with  various  personal
characteristics  vary across ethnic groups, we introduce a series of interaction terms
between es and xi,
Inwi = cao  + alei  +  a2xi + a3eixi + 43i-  (3)
Traditionally,  the significance of al  and a3 are interpreted as evidence of current
labour market discrimination,  while a2xi is assumed to be absorbing the effects of
variations in  personal characteristics, some of  which may be due  to  pre-market
discrimination. However, we  must be  aware of  potential omitted variable bias.
Omissions of particular concern include controls for innate ability, school quality,
worker  preferences  and comparative  advantages. 6
In accordance  with the literature on labour market discrimination,  we use equations
(2) and (3) as a basis for our conclusions about whether discrimination is causing
ethnic earnings  differentials  in the Ghanaian manufacturing  sector. We then build on
equation  (2) in our efforts  to identify  the form that this discrimination  takes.
Recall that, while a taste for discrimination is unlikely to lead directly to earnings
differentials  between ethnic groups, a taste for employing co-ethnics combined with
discrimination  in other markets could lead to segregation and, as a consequence,  to
such earnings  differentials. 7 To test whether  this is indeed the case, and establish the
extent to which ethnic earnings differentials  are the result of such a mechanism, we
introduce a vector of dummies, gj, dummies corresponding  to the ethnicity of the
workers' employers  into the earnings  function:-
lnwi  = xo  + alei + a2xi  + C4  gi + 44i  (4)
6  Variations in preferences for particular job  characteristics across ethnic groups could provide an alternative
explanation for both earnings differentials and sorting. It is, however, encouraging to note that variations in
preferences  have been less the concern of those interested  in black-white  differentials  than those focusing on male-
female differentials. Similarly, the discussion about variations in comparative advantages between groups has
primarily been limited to male-female  comparisons  (e.g. Becker (1991)).
7 Fafchamps (2000) shows that members of different ethnic groups have differential access to suppliers credit,
although his analysis  focuses on the distinction between  African and non-African  entrepreneurs  rather than finer
distinctions  between African entrepreneurs  from different  ethnic  groups.
8A significant  vector of coefficients,  a4, combined  with declines in the magnitude  and
significance  of elements  of  a, would indicate that ethnic segregation  due primarily  to
the employment  of co-ethnics is a source earnings  differentials.  We can take this line
of  analysis  one  step  further  by  introducing  another  vector  of  employer's
characteristics,  hi, that includes variables such as size and capital-labour  ratio into the
function,
lnwi=, xoG  + ale, +  a2xi + a4gi + a5hi +i  (5)
To the extent that the inclusion of hi reduces the significance of a4 we gain some
indication  as to why employers  from different ethnic groups pay differently.  Further,
workers  may be segregated  not only on the basis of co-ethnicity  with their employer.
Some ethnic groups may be  preferentially employed by  larger or  more capital
intensive enterprises,  or by public or foreign owned enterprises.  If this is the case the
introduction  of hi will cause  declines in the magnitude  and significance  of a(.8
Our data set is unusual in that it contains both worker and employer characteristics.
However, the range of employer characteristics  is limited. Thus, in order to fully
control for segregation we also estimate a version of (5) in which gi and hi are
replaced  with employer's fixed effects,  di (fixed  across  workers not time),
lnwi = aO +  ales  +  a 2xi  +  a 6 di + 4 6 - (6)
Having fully controlled for segregation effects we can focus entirely on within-
enterprise  variations in earnings between ethnic groups. So, to this final with-fixed-
effects specification  we first, rather circumspectly,  introduce a vector of occupational
dummies,  oi,
lnwi  = cO  + alei  +  a2xi  + a6 di + c 7o0i +  ,7i  (7)
and monitor the effect on cc,.  Significant  elements  in a7 combined  with a reduction in
the magnitude and significance of elements in ccl,  could indicate that there is job
crowding for some ethnic groups. However, it could also indicate that the observed
personal characteristics  previously entered into the earnings function are failing to
pick up some important  aspects  of human  capital which are correlated  with job type.
8 Even in the US, where we might expect labour markets  to function better,  employer characteristics  such as sector
and size are found to be important determinants  of earnings (e.g., Krueger and Sunmmers  (1988) and Brown and
Medoff  (1989)).
9We also endeavour to establish whether observed earnings differentials are due to
statistical discrimination.  Altonji and Pierrot (1997) test for statistical discrimination
under the assumption  that employers learn about workers as the latter's exposure to
the labour market increases. As the employers learn, workers' pay becomes more
dependent  on  actual  productivity  and  less  dependent  on  easily  observable
characteristics  such as ethnicity. Thus, in a wage equation that contains interactions
between  experience  and both ethnicity  and a hard-to-observe  variable  that is correlated
with productivity, the coefficient on the former will be such that ethnic earnings
differentials decline with experience,  while the coefficient on the latter will be such
that  the  effect  of  the  hard-to-observe characteristic increases with  experience.
Adopting this approach, taking mother's years of education as our hard-to-observe
variable,  and using (2) and (6) as alternative  base functions,  we arrive at the following
two empirical  formulations:-
lnw 1 = cO  + alei  +  a2Xi + a8aeiJ(k 1) + cx9amj(ki) +  g8ax,  (8a)
and  lnwi  = co  + alei  +  a2xi + a6 di + asbeij(k 1) +  CL9bmij(ki)  +  ,8bi
(8b)
where ki is years of experience,  ](ki) is the experience  profile of earnings, and mi is
mother's years of education.
3.2 Investigating  the variations in earnings between employers'  kin, co-ethnics and
other workers
In order to establish  whether  employers' relatives  and co-ethnics  earn more than other
workers  we estimate  the following:-
lnwi=  o+Pj3 1ri+  P2Ci+fP3Zi+P4gi+P5h1+49ai  (9a)
and with employer  fixed effects,
lnw  =Po+Pjri+  ,B 2 Ci+13 3Zi,+, 6 di+  9bi  (9b)
where r, is a dummy  that takes the value one if the worker is related to the employer,
ci is a dummy that takes the value one if the worker is from the same ethnic group as
the employer, and zi is  a  vector of  other worker characteristics, i.e.,  it is  the
10combination  of ei and xi, but excluding ri and c,. Significant  and positive coefficients
on ri  and  ci indicate that relatives and co-ethnics respectively receive a positive
earnings  premium  relative to other workers.
Co-ethnicity  is defined with respect to shared ethnic identity, while relatedness is
defined  with reference to an known social linkage. While co-ethnic  and even non-co-
ethnic workers  may have a social linkage with their employer,  its is only relatives  that
definitely  have such a linkage. Thus, a significant  positive coefficient on ri should be
taken as evidence of a network effect associated either with superior information
relating to job  matching or  a more sustained productivity effect due perhaps to
reduced moral hazard or greater esprit de corps (Clague (1993)). In  contrast, a
significant  positive coefficient on ci should be taken as evidence of either a taste for
discrimination  in favour of co-ethnics or statistical discrimination based on shared
ethnic identity.
In an endeavour to establish whether any identified earnings premiums are due to
statistical  discrimination  or a similar networking  effect, we adapt Altonji and Pierrot's
(1997) approach. In this  context, the growing importance of the hard-to-observe
characteristic  is confounded  by the fact that it will be easier to observe for the related
and co-ethnic employees.  For this reason we introduce only the interaction between
experience  and the relationship  dummies,
lnwi  =  Po  + Piri  +  P2  Ci +  P3 Zi +  P4 gi + PA  + P 7rif(k1)  + P8ci  A(ki) + 410ai,
(lOa)
and
lnwi =  Po+ f3ri +  P2 Ci  +  03Zi +  f 6di  + 07ri A(k 1)  +  c1i 1(ki)  +  IObi-
(lOb)
If 07 and/or P8 are such that the effects of being related or co-ethnic with one's
employer decline with experience, then we may conclude that the  source of any
earnings premium afforded to these groups is due to statistical discrimination or a
similar networking  effect. If either or both premiums do not decline with experience,
then we must look for other explanations such as a taste for discrimination or a
productivity  effect.
114. Data
Our data is drawn from the fifth wave of the Ghanaian Manufacturing Enterprise
Survey (GMES). 9 The sample of enterprises is drawn from four cities in southern
Ghana. Each of these cities could be described as potential melting pots, i.e., as
environments within which Gluckman (1961) expected to  see ethnicity decline in
importance  over time. Approximately  one third of these enterprises are in Kumasi, a
city to the north-west  of the capital,  Accra. Less than five percent of the sample are in
either Cape Coast or Takoradi, on the coast to the west of Accra. All the remaining
enterprises in  the  sample are situated in  Accra. For  each enterprise there  is  a
corresponding  sample of up to 10 waged workers  and up to 10 apprentices.  In the fifth
wave of the GMES the questionnaires  for the entrepreneurs,  defined to include owner-
managers and general managers or managing directors of corporate enterprises, and
the  workers and  apprentices contained questions about ethnic  identity and  the
incidence  of blood relations  between  workers  and apprentices  and their employers.
The ethnic structure of the Ghanaian population is complex. There are over one
hundred distinct ethnic groups some of which combine  to make up larger groups. The
Akan, for example, is made up of around twenty groups, including the Asante, the
Fante, the Akyem, the Akuapem, the Kwahu, and the Brong. Many of the ethnic
groups have distinct languages. Others, while sharing their  languages consider
themselves to be distinct for cultural or historical reasons. Our approach during the
survey was to ask each entrepreneur,  worker and apprentice  which ethnic group they
were from. Coding then took place after the fieldwork  was complete. Thus, our data
captures the ethnic identities that the individuals ascribe to themselves. It is worth
noting that none of the respondents  had any difficulty  deciding on the ethnic group to
which they belonged. In the case of corporate enterprises, if the general manager or
managing  director was not available, although  the questions  relating to the enterprises
accounts and operations were asked of other managers, the ethnicity questions were
not asked. As a results some observations  had to be dropped  from this analysis.
The data required for this analysis  was collected from a sample of 1045 workers and
294 apprentices  (see Table 1). A total of 35 Ghanaian  ethnic groups are represented in
9 The first three waves of this survey  were conducted as part of the World  Bank's Regional Program  for Enterprise
Development.  The last two were conducted as part of a project on labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa. All five
12this sample along with two other West African groups that have been present in
Ghana for several generations  (Hausa and Kokomba)  and are described as Ghanaian
throughout the analysis below. For the purposes of the analysis the workers and
apprentices  are allocated to six ethnic categorisations  (see Table 2): the Asante, a sub-
group of the Akan; the Fante, another  sub-group  of the Akan; Other Akan; the Ga and
Adangbe, which are combined throughout and referred to as the Ga-Adangbe as a
reminded;  the Ewe; and Northern, which includes  the two migrant groups as well as
thirteen  groups indigenous  to Ghana. Tables 1 and 2 are constructed  in such a way that
it is easy for the reader  to see how the allocations  are done.'0
The samples of workers and apprentices are spread across 189 employers. The
distribution  of these employers  with respect to ethnicity  is presented in disaggregated
form in the final column of Table 1 and in the aggregated  form to be used in the
analysis in the final column of Table 2. Note that, while we have excluded non-
Ghanaians  from the sample of workers and apprentices,  12.7 percent of the employer
sample  are Middle Eastern,  Asian or European." Excluding  these employers  from the
analysis  would greatly reduce the proportion  of larger enterprises in our sample.  Note
that, as we mentioned above,  the distributions  of workers,  apprentices  and employers
across  the six Ghanaian  ethnic categorisations  are very similar. In all cases the Asante
make up the largest proportion  (between  21 and 39 percent), with the Fante as second
largest (between 17 and 23 percent). The Other Akan, Ga-Adangbe  and Ewe groups
assume quite similar proportions (between 11 and  17 percent), while only the
Northern group accounts for less than 10 percent in each sample. In part, this ethnic
distribution  reflects the geographical  focus of the survey.  Kumasi is the capital of the
Asante region, while Cape Coast and Takoradi are the two largest towns in the Fante
region. A relatively small ethnic group, the Ga, are indigenous  to the capital, Accra,
while the Adangbe traditionally  occupy  the area to the east of Accra. The Other Akan
groups come from the area to the north of Accra and surrounding  Kumasi. The Ewe
are from the south-eastern  part of the country, but have been present in Accra and
waves were funded by the Department  for international  Development  and conducted by the Centre for the Study  of
African Economies  in collaboration  with the University  of Ghana and the Ghana Statistical Service.
'° The Guan, included under Other Akan, was the only sub-group  that proved difficult to classify.  The Guan is
divided into several smaller groups some of which consider themselves  to be Akan and some not. Of the groups
represented in our sample,  the Gonja are the only group to which this applies. They have been included in Other
Akan, but might be more appropriately  classified as Northern. As only two employees  and one apprentice are
Gonja,  their classification  is unlikely to affect the results of the analysis.
i l Data was collected for 23 non-Ghanaian  employees  and apprentices.  This is an insufficient  number from which
to draw  conclusions.  Thus, they have been excluded from the analysis.
13Kumasi for several generations.  Being the largest and most industrialized,  these cities
have also been a focus for migrants  from the North.
Our vector of personal characteristics  includes years of education and its square,
potential years of experience (age-education  - 6) and its square.12  We also include a
gender dummy, a dummy indicating whether the worker is married, two location
dummies, and mother's years of schooling  as a control for family background. 13 The
dummy  indicating  whether  the worker or apprentice  is a relative  of his/her employer  is
constructed  with reference  to a direct question posed to the workers and apprentices.
The dummy indicating whether the worker or apprentice is a member of the same
ethnic group as his/her employer is based on a coincidence in the detailed ethnic
classification.  Thus, for example, if a Kwahu worker has an Akyem employer, even
though they are both classified as 'Other Akan' the co-ethnic  dummy  will take a value
of zero. This dummy  has been defined  to exclude  relatives. So, in effect we have three
groups of workers,  relatives  of the employers,  unrelated  co-ethnics,  and others.
Our vector of employer characteristic  includes  the log of the total number of workers
they employ, the log of their capital-labour  ratio, eight sub-sector dummies, and two
dummies indicating some public ownership and  some foreign ownership. Three
occupational  dummies are introduced into (7), one for managerial positions, one for
clerical and sales personnel, and one for unskilled  production workers. The basis for
comparison is  skilled production workers. The classification of  employees into
occupations was conducted during the interviews  with workers and, in many cases,
may be quite arbitrary.  The size of the enterprise  may have affected the number and
type of occupational categories used  in  the process and  it  is  likely that some
classifications were made at least partially with reference to the pay the worker
receives. Thus, the estimated coefficients  for (7) may be subject to endogeneity  bias
and must be treated with considerable  caution.
12 When testing for statistical discrimination  by interacting experience  with ethnicity, the most natural choice of
experience  variable  would be tenure, i.e., the number of years during which the current employer  has observed  the
employee. We rejected this measure  for two reasons: first, it is highly likely to be endogenous and, second, we
wish to be consistent with Altonji and Pierrot (1997). Potential experience does not seem such an unnatural
choice,  if one thinks of it as the years for which an employee  is expected  to account and provide references.
13 Mother's and father's education  were found to be highly correlated  and there were more missing  observations in
the latter.  This may reflect the fact that the majority of the employees  in our sample come from matrilieal  groups
and that in several of the groups, both matrilineal and patrilineal,  the father does not traditionally live with the
children and their mother.
14Most of the analysis  that follows  will focus on workers  only. Apprentices  are excluded
because  their 'pocket money' is determined  by a different  process from the earnings  of
workers.  To a large extent, they are paid or given  what they need to subsist.  In general,
if they are related  to their masters  the latter support  them. Otherwise,  if their relatives
can support them they are given no pocket money by their masters and, if not, they
receive meals, clothing, accommodation  and/or pocket money from their masters (see
Appendix 1). Table 3 shows that on average apprentices  are paid little more than one
tenth of the amount  paid to employees.  It also shows that they tend to be younger,  less
educated  and from less educated  backgrounds  (see mother's years of education)  than
workers. They tend to be found only in smaller,  less capital intensive enterprises,  and
most commonly in traditional trades sub-sectors such as furniture, garments and
metalworking.
All these differences  notwithstanding,  it is useful to note that a significant  proportion,
nearly 13 percent, of apprentices are serving under a relative, while a further 41
percent are serving under a non-related member of the same ethnic group. Table 4
contains a cross-tabulation  of apprentices' and their masters' broad ethnic groups.
This shows that the tendency to serve under a master from the same ethnic group
varies significantly  across  the groups.  Asante, Fante  and Ewe are highly likely  to serve
co-ethnics,  while Other Akan are more likely to be serving an Asante or Fante master
than  another Other Akan. According to  a  Chi-squared test the  hypothesis that
apprentices  are distributed between masters  without regard to ethnicity is rejected at
the 0.1 percent significance  level.
Table 5 contains similar statistics for fully paid workers.  Workers are only marginally
less likely to be working for a relative (I I percent), but significantly  less likely to be
working for a  non-related member of the same ethnic group (23 percent). This
notwithstanding  the cross-tabulation  at the bottom of Table 5 indicates  that employees
from every ethnic group are more likely to be working for a member of their own
ethnic group than for a member of another Ghanaian ethnic group. According  to a
Chi-squared test the hypothesis that employees are distributed between Ghanaian
employers  without  regard for ethnicity is rejected  at the 0.1 percent significance  level.
The pattern is disturbed if we introduce non-Ghanaian  employers  into the analysis,  as
Ga-Adangbe  and Northerners  are more likely to be working  for them than for their co-
ethnics.
15Table 5 also contains the mean monthly earnings  (in Cedi) and the means of several
other variables for each ethnic group. There is considerable  variation  between groups.
On average, the Other Akan (used as a basis for comparison  throughout  the analysis)
earn more than all the other groups  with the exception  of the Ga-Adangbe  with whom
they are on a par. They earn 7 percent  more than Fante, 28 percent more than Ewe, 30
percent more than Asante, and 67 percent more than Northerners.  Turning  to the mean
years of education for each group, note that Ga-Adangbe  are the most educated with
the Other Akan a close second, while on average  Northerners have far fewer years of
education  than any other group. This distinction  between Northerners and the other
groups  is also evident in the frequency  distributions  for years of education  contained
in Figure 1. Here, we can see that the lower average  years of education  for Northerners
is due to the high proportion who have no education.1 4 This is the only strikingly
obvious difference between Northerners' personal characteristics  and those of other
ethnic groups.
5. Results
5.1 Investigating  the variations  in earnings  between  ethnic groups
Specification (1) (first column, Table 6) indicates that Asante earn 0.28 less than
Other Akan in terms of log earnings,  Fante 0.21 less, Ewe 0.25 less, and Northerners
0.45 less. All of these differences are significant at the one percent level. Further,
pairwise comparisons  of coefficients  indicate that the Ga-Adangbe  earn significantly
more than all other groups except the Other Akan (p-values of 0.001, 0.02, 0.005,
0.0000, when compared with the Asante, Fante, Ewe and Northerners respectively)
and Northerners earn significantly  less than all other groups (p-values of 0.06, 0.01,
0.04 when compared with Asante, Fante and Ewe respectively).
In  specification (2)  we  control for a  series of worker characteristics. Years of
education  and experience  both enter the earnings  function in quadratic  form, with the
education  profile of earnings  being convex  and the experience  profile  being concave.' 5
These relationships  are quite stable across all the specifications  presented in Table 6.
14  Years  in Koranic  school are not taken into account  when coaculating  years of education.
IS This is consistent with the findings of Bigsten et al (1998), that higher levels of education are associated  with
increasingly  higher returns in the manufacturing  sectors of several sub-Saharan  countries.
16In contrast, the significantly  negative  premium associated with being female and the
positive effect of mothers' education disappear once we fully control for employer
characteristics  suggesting  that there is sorting between employers  on the basis of both
gender and family background.  Finally, workers in Cape Coast and Takoradi earn
significantly  less than those in the capital city even after we control for several other
employer characteristics,  while those in Kumasi earn less primarily because of the
smaller size of the enterprises  sampled  there. Introducing  these worker characteristics
into the earnings  function considerably  reduces  both the magnitude  and significance  of
the log eamings differentials.  Most of the differentials  have at least halved. The only
remaining  significant  differentials  are those between the Other Akan and the Asante,
Fante and Ewe. All the rest are not statistically  distinguishable  from zero at the ten
percent level.
In specification (3) (reported separately in Table 7) we introduce interaction terms
between the five ethnic dummies and each of the worker characteristics.  We then
conduct an F-test for the set of interaction  terms corresponding  to each characteristic.
Only the F-statistic relating to the interactions  between ethnicity  and being located in
Kumasi was significant  at the ten percent level. This result is driven by the eamings
differential between Ewe and Other Akan in that location. However, both Ewe in
Kumasi and Other Akan in Kumasi each account for under 3 percent of our sample.
So, we should be wary of taking too much heed of this result. One other interaction
term is significant  even though the corresponding  F-statistic  is not * Northerners  face
a significantly  lower return on experience than Other Akan. We shall return to this
latter result again below. In the interim,  based on these results, we conclude that there
is little significant variation in the returns associated with personal characteristics
between ethnic  groups and  favour specification (2)  as  a  basis  for  our  further
investigations.
Specification (4) (Table 6) contains a  set of  six dummies corresponding to  the
ethnicity of the employers.  These indicate that, in the absence of any other controls
relating to the employers' characteristics,  Fante and Non-Ghanaian employers pay
significantly more than Other Akan, while Ewe employers pay significantly less.
Pairwise comparisons  of coefficients indicate that Fante also pay significantly  more
than Asante, Ga-Adangbe,  and Ewe employers  (p-values  of 0.009, 0.01, and 0.0000
respectively) and Ewe also pay significantly less than Asante, Ga-Adangbe, and
17Northerners  (p-values  of 0.004, 0.02, and 0.006 respectively).  Taking account of these
employer  effects eliminates  the unexplained  earnings  differential  between Other Akan
and Ewe, but leaves those between Other Akan and Asante and Fante intact in terms
of both magnitude  and significance.
Controlling for other employer characteristics  as in specification (5) tends to reduce
the size and significance of the employers' ethnic dummies, but not those of the
workers. Indeed, the differentials  between Other Akan and Asante and Northerners
have grown in both size and significance.  The growing differential between Other
Akan and Asante workers is probably due to omitted  variable bias, as it declines and
becomes insignificant  once employer fixed effects are introduced (specification  (6)).
In contrast, the differential between Other Akan and Northerners remains large and
significant. Fully  controlling for  employer characteristics brings out  one  other
significant  differential - Ewe also earn significantly  more than Northerners (p-value
of 0.03).
Introducing occupational  dummies renders the differential between Northerners and
all other ethnic groups except the Ewe insignificant.  Northerners' lower earnings
could be partially due to occupational  segregation.  The Ewe are further distinguished
once we introduce occupational dummies; Ewes now earn significantly more than
Asante (p-value of 0.04) and Fante (p-value of 0.06) as well as Northerners (p-value
of 0.02). We interpret this unusual result for Ewe workers as evidence that they are
occupationally  classified in a different way to other groups. In particular, we suspect
that there are some who are performing  managerial  tasks and being paid accordingly,
but who are nevertheless  classified as skilled production  workers.  Note from Table 5
that very few Ewe are classified as management,  while a relatively large proportion
are classified as  skilled production. This interpretation is  also  born out  by the
occupational multinomial logit presented in Appendix 2, which shows that, after
controlling for both worker and employer characteristics,  Ewe are significantly less
likely to  be in managerial positions and significantly  more likely to be in skilled
production  worker  positions than members  of other ethnic groups.
Table 8 contains the results of estimating specifications (8a) and (8b). Few of the
interaction terms between experience and its square and the ethnic dummies and
mother's education  are significant.  Using a general to specific approach we arrived at
18two preferred specifications.  When employers' characteristics  are not controlled  for
preferred specification contains only the interaction between experience and the
Northern dummy  and this is significant  only when the Northern dummy, which is not
significant, is excluded (see (8a*)). When employers' characteristics  are controlled
for, once again it is the Northern-experience  interaction  term that survives  (see (8b*)),
although in this case it is not necessary  to remove the Northern dummy in order for
the interaction  term to be significant.  These  results suggest  that the identified  earnings
differentials are  not  due  to  statistical discrimination. However, as  employers'
knowledge  of Northern workers grows, they are paid less than similar workers from
other groups. This  would be  consistent with Northerners being inherently less
productive  perhaps because of language  barriers (only 9 percent of Northerners state
that Twi is their most proficient reading language) or the effect of school quality.
Alternatively,  the results are consistent with discrimination against Northerners by
employers who  choose not  to  increase their  pay  or  promote them  over time.
Subsequent investigations have shown that  the lower return on  experience for
Northern workers is not due to (1) their concentration  in unskilled jobs, (2) them
receiving  less on-the-job  training (31 percent of Northerners compared  to 33 percent
of  others have  received such  training from  their  current employer), or  (3)  a
complementarity  between years of education  and years of experience combined  with
their lower average  years of education.  16
5.2 Investigating the variations in earnings between employers' kin, co-ethnics and
other workers
With respect to variations in earnings between employers' kin, co-ethnics and other
workers,  consider first the results presented in the fourth and fifth columns  of Table 6
(correspond to  specifications (9a) and (9b)). The greater the degree to which we
control for  employer characteristics, the more accurately the  coefficient on  the
relatedness variable is determined. With reference  to the specification that includes
employer fixed effects, being related to the employer is associated with a 23 percent
16  In this investigation  experience  was interacted with years  of education,  with the occupational  dummies,  and with
a dummy  indicating  that a worker has at some  time received  training from their current employer.
19earnings premium.' 7 Following the  introduction of  occupational dummies this
premium declines to 18 percent (see final column of Table 6) suggesting either that
relatives  are allocated better  jobs as well as being paid more for whatever  job they do
or that the relatedness  dummy  is correlated  with unobserved  human capital. In neither
specification (9a) nor specification (9b) is there evidence that unrelated co-ethnics
earn any more than other  unrelated  workers.
Results relating  to specifications  (1Oa)  and (lOb) are presented in Table 9. In neither
of these specifications  are the coefficients  on the interaction  terms between experience
and its square and the relatedness variable significant  at the ten percent level. The
earnings  premium for relatives  does not vary with worker experience.  For this reason
we  re-estimated the  functions excluding the  relatedness interaction terms. The
coefficients on the interaction terms between experience and its square and the co-
ethnicity  variable  reveal that inexperienced  co-ethnics  receive a positive  premium, but
that this premium declines as experience increases  and eventually  becomes negative
(see Figure 2). For very experienced  co-ethnic  workers the premium may start to rise
again. However, given the frequency  distribution  of the experience  across our sample
of workers,  the upward  sloping section  of the graph could be merely an artefact.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis provides evidence of some quite large earnings differentials between
ethnic groups within the manufacturing sector. A significant proportion of these
differentials can be  explained with reference to a  fairly standard set of observed
workers' characteristics.  In particular, workers' educational attainments and family
backgrounds are found to  vary across ethnic groups, accounting for a  significant
proportion  of the earnings  differentials  and suggesting  that pre-market discrimination
is important  in the Ghanaian  context. In particular,  Northerners earn considerably  less
17 Note that before we start controlling for employers' characteristics  the relatedness variable has a significant
negative coefficient. This is because relatives are more likely to be employed in small, less technologically
advanced  businesses.  It is only after we have controlled for these other factors that the positive effect of relatedness
can be observed.
20that other groups  primarily  because  of their lower years of education.  The differentials
that remain after controlling for observed personal characteristics  are between the
relatively high earning Other Akan and the relatively  low earning Asante, Fante, and
Ewe.
The tendency for workers  to be employed by a member of their own ethnic group is
strong. When combined with the fact that entrepreneurs  from different ethnic groups
run very different types of enterprise this tendency explains some of the earnings
differentials. In particular, there is evidence to suggest that Ewes earn less because
Ewe employers pay significantly less, perhaps because of discrimination in  other
markets.  Segregation,  but not due to the favoured  employment  of co-ethnics,  explains
why Other Akan earn more than Asante and Fante, i.e., Other Akan work for better
paying employers. Only Northerners appear to do less well, given their observed
characteristics,  after we control for employers' characteristics.  Northerners earnings
accord, on average, with their personal  characteristics.  However,  underlying this is a
tendency for them to earn less than their non-Northern  colleagues and an offsetting
tendency  for them to work for higher paying  employers.
Few of these differentials  in labour market outcomes appears to be due to statistical
discrimination on  the  part  of  employers. Indeed, there  is  some  evidence that
inexperienced  Northerners are given the benefit of the doubt and are paid less only
later in their careers. This could be due to language barriers or to issues relating to
school quality, although we do not currently have the data to  formally test these
hypotheses. The superior performance of Other Akan, especially with respect to
securing positions in  well paying establishments, may due  to  superior networks
facilitating  more effective  job search.  However, once again, we do not have the data
required  to formally  test this hypothesis.
Turning  to the role of kinship and co-ethnicity  in the determination  of earnings, we
present strong evidence that employers favour their relatives in terms of pay and
possibly  also in terms of job allocation.  These findings suggest that kinship networks
are playing an important role in Ghanaian labour markets. Further, this  earnings
premium does not decline as the relatives' exposure to the labour market increases,
i.e., it is not due to  some form of information asymmetry relating to youth and
inexperience. Although only very preliminary results are currently available (see
21Appendix 3), there is some evidence that this earnings premium is associated with
greater productivity, perhaps through an effect on esprit de corps. Unrelated co-
ethnics, on the other hand, receive  a premium  that is positive when they are young  and
inexperienced,  but that declines and may even become negative as their experience
grows.  This result is consistent  with the existence  of statistical  discrimination  relating
to shared ethnic identity.
In summary, the role of ethnicity in determining wages in Ghana's manufacturing
sector is complex, but  does not  defy analysis based on assumptions of rational
behaviour. With additional data, especially relating to school quality, language, and
networks, we may be able to  better identify the source of some of the earnings
differentials.  However,  even as they stand our results draw our attention  to some quite
startling differences  in educational  and labour market attainment  between groups and
make a strong case for such issues to be included  in policy  debate.
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25Table 1: Ethnic Composition  of Worker,  Apprentice,  and Employer  Samples
Workers  Apprentices  Employers
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent
AKAN
Asante  218  20.86  113  38.44  51  26.98
Fante  245  23.44  56  19.05  32  16.93
Akyem  50  4.78  7  2.38  6  3.17
Akuapem  33  3.16  4  1.36  4  2.12
Kwahu  29  2.78  5  1.70  9  4.76
Brong  15  1.44  11  3.74  5  2.65
Ahanta  12  1.15  1  0.53
Wassa  11  1.05  1  0.34  1  0.53
Nzema  10  0.96
Assin  2  0.19
Denkyira  1  0.10
Banda  1  0.34
Sefwi  1  0.34
Guan, unspec.  13  1.24  2  0.68
Guan, Efutu  3  0.29  1  0.53
Guan, Gonja  2  0.19  1  0.34
Guan,Buem  I  0.10
Guan,  Larteh  1  0.53
GA-ADANGBE
Ga  128  12.25  28  9.52  18  9.52
Krobo  15  1.44  4  1.36  2  1.06
Ada  14  1.34  2  0.68  1  0.53
EWE  182  17.42  36  12.24  28  14.81
NORTHERN
Grussie  12  1.15  1  0.34
Dagaaba  11  1.05  1  0.34  1  0.53
Dagomba  10  0.96  5  1.70  1  0.53
Busanga  5  0.48  3  1.02
Frafra  5  0.48  1  0.34
Kanjaga  2  0.19
Kasena  2  0.19
Kusasi  2  0.19  1  0.34
Mamprusi  1  0.10  1  0.34
Wala  i  0.10
Sisala  1  0.34
Builsa  3  0.29  2  0.68
Kanyaga  2  0.68
Hausa  7  0.67  3  1.02  3  1.59
Kokomba  1  0.34
NON-GHANAIAN
Middle Eastern  11  5.82
Asian  9  4.76
European  4  2.12
TOTAL  1045  100.00  294  100.00  189  100.00
26Table 2: Ethnic Composition of Workers, Apprentices, and Employers to be used
in the Analysis
Workers  Apprentices  Employers
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent
Asante  218  20.86  113  38.44  51  26.98
Fante  245  23.44  56  19.05  32  16.93
OtherAkan  182  17.42  33  11.22  28  14.81
Ga-Adangbe  157  15.02  34  11.56  21  11.11
Ewe  182  17.42  36  12.24  28  14.81
Northern  61  5.84  22  7.48  5  2.65
Non-Ghanaian  24  12.70
TOTAL  1045  100.00  294  100.00  189  100.00
27Table 3: Worker and Apprentice Characteristics and
Proportions
Workers  Apprentices
Sample  size  1045.00  294.00
Worker's  characteristics
Monthly  earnings  232,724  27,268
Years of education  11.04  9.02
Years of potential  experience  19.90  6.77
Female  17.80%  21.77%
Mother's  years of ed.  4.00  6.16
Worker-employer  relationship
Related  to employer  11.00%  12.93%
Same ethnic  group  21.63%  40.82%
Sector
Food  20.00%  1.70%
Feeds and Beverages  5.45%  0.00%
Furnature  16.08%  37.07%
Garments  9.19%  27.55%
Machinery  3.44%  11.22%
Other Metal  18.56%  19.39%
Plastics  and Chemicals  6.89%  0.68%
Textiles  4.69%  0.34%
Wood Processing  15.69%  2.04%
Employer  characteristics
Capital  labour  ratio  3.OOE+07  5.8  1EE+06
Number  of employees  120.26  29.84
Foreign ownership  30.14%  3.74%
State ownership  7.56%  0.00%
Location
Accra  61.44%  43.54%
Kumasi  25.65%  47.62%
Coast  12.92%  8.84%
Ethnicity  of Employer
Other Akan  17.70%  9.86%
Asante  23.06%  39.12%
Fante  17.42%  21.09%
Ga-Adangbe  9.47%  9.52%
Ewe  11.39%  15.31%
Northern  2.58%  4.42%
Non-Ghanaian  18.37%  0.68%
28Table 4: Distribution  of Apprentices  Across Masters  by Ethnic Group
Other  Asante  Fante  Ga-Adangbe  Ewe  Northern  All
Akan
Sample  size  33  113  56  34  36  22  294
Ethnicity of Master
OtherAkan  12.12%  9.73%  8.93%  11.76%  11.11%  4.55%  21.09%
Asante  36.36%  70.80%  21.43%  2.94%  11.11%  27.27%  9.86%
Fante  24.24%  14.16%  53.57%  20.59%  4.55%  39.12%
Ga-Adangbe  15.15%  1.77%  5.36%  41.18%  8.33%  4.55%  9.52%
Ewe  9.09%  3.54%  7.14%  20.59%  69.44%  9.09%  15.31%
Northern  1.79%  2.94%  50.00%  4.42%
Non-Ghanaian  3.03%  1.79%  0.68%
29Table 5: Means and Proportions  for Workers  by Ethnic Group
Other  Asante  Fante  Ga-  Ewe  Northern  All
Akan  Adangbe
Sample  size  182  218  245  157  182  61  1045
Worker's  characteristics
Monthly  earnings  265,064  204,610  248,159  268,364  207,416  158,491  232,724
Years of education  11.64  11.39  10.80  11.83  11.08  6.72  11.04
Y'rs potential  experience  20.89  17.86  20.67  20.04  18.45  25.20  19.90
Female  18.13%  15.14%  16.73%  21.66%  17.58%  21.31%  17.80%
Married  68.68%  65.60%  65.31%  75.80%  65.93%  72.13%  68.04%
Mother's years of ed.  3.56  4.41  3.73  5.01  4.23  1.61  4.00
Occupation
Management  15.93%  13.30%  11.48%  12.82%  5.49%  3.28%  11.32%
Services  19.23%  16.51%  20.49%  17.31%  16.48%  13.11%  17.84%
Skilled  Production  53.30%  57.34%  54.10%  58.33%  64.29%  50.82%  56.85%
Unskilled  11.54%  12.84%  13.93%  11.54%  13.74%  32.79%  14.00%
Employee-employer  relationship
Related  to employer  7.69%  14.22%  13.47%  7.64%  12.64%  3.28%  11.00%
Same ethnic group  7.69%  46.33%  20.41%  10.19%  21.98%  8.20%  21.63%
Sector
Food  16.48%  14.22%  26.12%  29.30%  12.64%  24.59%  20.00%
Feeds and Beverages  6.59%  5.96%  1.63%  9.55%  6.04%  3.28%  5.45%
Furnature  12.64%  22.02%  15.51%  14.65%  18.68%  3.28%  16.08%
Garments  11.54%  8.72%  6.94%  8.28%  12.09%  6.56%  9.19%
Machinery  3.30%  0.46%  2.45%  1.27%  7.69%  11.48%  3.44%
Other Metal  23.63%  12.84%  18.78%  14.65%  23.08%  19.67%  18.56%
Plastics  and Chemicals  4.95%  9.17%  5.31%  10.19%  6.04%  4.92%  6.89%
Textiles  6.59%  1.83%  2.45%  8.28%  7.14%  1.64%  4.69%
Wood Processing  14.29%  24.77%  20.82%  3.82%  6.59%  24.59%  15.69%
Employer  characteristics
Capital labour  ratio  3.4E+07  2.3E+07  2.5E+07  4.2E+07  3.7E+07  2.OE+07  3.OE+07
Number  of employees  136.66  89.49  132.20  153.97  99.57  108.34  120.26
Foreign  ownership  32.97%  22.48%  30.20%  37.58%  30.22%  29.51%  30.14%
State ownership  9.34%  5.96%  5.3  1%  12.74%  5.49%  9.84%  7.56%
Location
Accra  64.84%  28.44%  61.63%  88.54%  79.67%  44.26%  61.44%
Kumasi  13.19%  68.81%  11.84%  6.37%  15.38%  44.26%  25.65%
Coast  21.98%  2.75%  26.53%  5.10%  4.95%  11.48%  12.92%
Ethnicity  of Employer
Other Akan  32.97%  9.63%  19.18%  13.38%  14.84%  14.75%  17.7%
Asante  11.54%/o 59.63%  15.10%  13.38%  11.54%  18.03%  23.06%
Fante  17.03%  10.09%  33.06%  12.74%  10.99%  13.11%  17.42%
Ga-Adangbe  8.79%  3.21%  10.61%  19.75%  9.34%  3.28%  9.47%
Ewe  5.49%  1.38%  6.94%  15.29%  34.07%  4.92%  11.39%
Northern  0.55%  1.83%  1.63%  2.55%  0.55%  21.31%  2.58%
Non-Ghanaian  23.63%  14.22%  13.47%  22.93%  18.68%  24.59%  18.37%
30Table 6: Earnings  and Ethnic Identity  (dependent  variable = log of monthly  earnings  in Cedi, n = 1045)
(1)  (2)  (4)  (5) and (9a)  (6) and (9b)  (7)
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.
Constant  12.1932  0.0552  10.9061  0.1265-'-  10.8376  0.1283  10.3774  0.2264"  10.9751  0.1838  .'  11.2775  0.1504
Asante  -0.2754  0.0748  -0.1242  0.0694  -0.1398  0.0702  -0.1566  0.0635  -0.0822  0.0595  -0.0572  0.0512
Fante  -0.2088  0.0768  -0.1140  0.0632  -0.1234  0.0632  -0.1117  0.0573  -0.0591  0.0493  -0.0384  0.0433
Ga-Adangbe  -0.0179  0.0838  -0.0914  0.0700  -0.0435  0.0660  -0.0479  0.0605  -0.0845  0.0608  -0.0361  0.0530
Ewe  -0.2513  0.0777  -0.1560  0.0646  -0.0618  0.0665  -0.0706  0.0589  -0.0105  0.0528  0.0555  0.0475
Northern  -0.4528  0.0963  -0.1149  0.0898  -0.1248  0.0919  -0.1821  0.0858  -0.1854  0.0820-  -0.1071  0.0728
Related  to employer  -0.1240  0.0663  -0.0401  0.0703  0.1370  0.0714  0.2319  0.0704  0.1806  0.0625
Same ethnic group  -0.0647  0.0483  0.0278  0.0543  0.0726  0.0522  0.0136  0.0567  0.0306  0.0492
Years of education  0.0123  0.0137  0.0140  0.0137  0.0038  0.0135  -0.0148  0.0132  -0.0108  0.0126
Years of ed. sq.  0.0043  0.0006  '  0.0042  0.0006  - 0.0037  0.0006  0.0044  0.0006  *-  0.0025  0.0006
Years of experience  0.0382  0.0063  .'  0.0371  0.0062  ...  0.0237  0.0060  0.0380  0.0063  *-  0.0278  0.0058
Yrs of experience sq.  -0.0005  0.0001  -0.0005  0.0001  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0004  0.0001  *  -0.0003  0.0001
Female  -0.1274  0.0561  -0.1421  0.0553  -0.0902  0.0506  -0.0196  0.0485  0.0193  0.0467
Married  0.0832  0.0536  0.0761  0.0528  0.0342  0.0497  0.0142  0.0414  0.0081  0.0373
Mother's years of ed.  0.0069  0.0044  0.0080  0.0043  0.0090  0.0040  0.0049  0.0034  0.0038  0.0031
Kumasi  -0.1523  0.0489  -0.1556  0.0558  -0.0447  0.0631
Coast  -0.1515  0.0664  -0.1359  0.0625 *  -0.2787  0.0711
E-Asante  -0.0016  0.0741  -0.0789  0.0664
E-Fante  0.1341  0.0631  0.0536  0.0596
E-Ga-Adangbe  -0.0553  0.0763  0.0232  0.0777
E-Ewe  -0.2917  0.0833  -0.2038  0.0832
E-Northem  0.1213  0.1504  -0.0501  0.1552
E-Non-Ghanaian  0.2290  0.0598  0.0029  0.0641
Foreign owned  -0.0898  0.0507
State owned  0.1057  0.0703
Capital-labour  ratio  0.0031  0.0135
No. of employees  0.2134  0.0211
Management  0.6401  0.0637
Unskilled  -0.3212  0.0424
Clerical/Sales  -0.0320  0.0467
Rsq.  0.0282  0.3696  0.4017  0.4990  0.7111  0.7699
Notes:  Standard  errors corrected  for heteroskedasticity  using White's  (1980) procedure.  *  - significant  at the  1 percent  level,  **  - significant  at the  5
percent level, * - significant at the 10 percent level. Specification  (5) includes eight sector dummies, specifications  (6) and (7) include employer fixed effects.
31Table 7: Earnings and Ethnic Identity,  Specification (3) (dependent variable=log of monthly earnings in Cedi, n = 1045)
Base group  Interactions  with  Interactions  with  Interactions  with  Interactions  with  Interactions  with  F-test  on all
Other Akan  Asante  Fante  Ga-Adangbe  Ewe  Northern  interaction  terms
Coef  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  P-value
Constant  10.8381  0.3152  0.0599  0.4437  -0.1856  0.3913  0.1625  0.4920  -0.1178  0.4206  0.5238  0.5077  0.1804
Relatedtoemployer  -0.1845  0.1623  0.0002  0.2326  0.1795  0.2052  0.4650  0.2984  -0.0904  0.2028  0.4423  0.5524  0.3229
Same ethnic group  -0.0954  0.1402  0.0086  0.1693  0.1735  0.1761  0.1805  0.2486  -0.0103  0.1799  -0.0582  0.3141  0.7767
Years of education  0.0026  0.0450  0.0097  0.0559  0.0088  0.0527  0.0120  0.0639  0.0155  0.0519  -0.0006  0.0562  0.9992
Years of ed. sq.  0.0044  0.0017  -0.0001  0.0022  0.0005  0.0021  -0.0008  0.0024  -0.0002  0.0020  -0.0004  0.0026  0.9957
Years of experience  0.0559  0.0157  -0.0219  0.0212  -0.0244  0.0199  -0.0402  0.0263  -0.0093  0.0245  -0.0449  0.0272  0.5155
Yrs of experience  sq.  -0.0008  0.0003  0.0005  0.0004  0.0004  0.0003  0.0007  0.0005  0.0001  0.0004  0.0006  0.0004  0.5063
Female  -0.2389  0.1326  0.1519  0.1847  0.0233  0.1936  0.1057  0.2140  0.2934  0.1902  0.1356  0.2147  0.7026
Married  0.0178  0.1421  0.0876  0.1764  0.1299  0.1851  0.2499  0.1911  -0.0296  0.2139  -0.1135  0.2561  0.6167
Mother's  years of ed.  0.0129  0.0105  -0.0082  0.0136  -0.0012  0.0152  -0.0163  0.0159  -0.0037  0.0152  -0.0233  0.0225  0.8358
Kumasi  -0.0211  0.1388  -0.2912  0.1797  0.1135  0.1763  -0.1650  0.2150  -0.3129  0.1780  -0.0263  0.2020  0.0507
Coast  -0.1101  0.1261  -0.1971  0.2395  0.0049  0,1710  -0.0865  0.2592  -0.0909  0.1789  0.1282  0.3208  0.9271
Notes: R  0.3936. In the row marked  'Constant' and the columns  headed 'Interactions  with Asante' etc. we present  the coefficients  on the ethnic dummies.  In those columns  and
in later rows are the coefficients  on the interactions  between  the ethnic dummies  and each of the personal characteristics  listed. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
using White's (1980) procedure.  *"* - significant at the I percent level, **  - significant at the 5 percent level,  * - significant at the 10 percent  level.
32Table 8: Testing for  Statistical Discrimination on the basis  of Ethnic Identity (dependent
variable = log of monthly earnings in Cedi,  n = 1045)
(8a)  (8a*)  (8b)  (8b*)
Coef  s.e.  Coef  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.
Related  to employer  -0.1307  0.0665  -0.1251  0.0661  0.2359  0.0700  0.2409  0.0707
Same ethnic group  -0.0620  0.0488  -0.0631 0.0482  0.0143  0.0575  0.0162  0.0567
Asante  -0.0132  0.1611  -0.1267 0.0674  0.0793  0.1441  -0.0833  0.0595
Fante  0.1018  0.1554  -0.1179 0.0622  0.1253  0.1248  -0.0604  0.0494
Ga-Adangbe  0.1194  0.2048  -0.0943 0.0687  0.1262  0.1704  -0.0862  0.0609
Ewe  0.0612  0.1629  -0.1587 0.0632  0.1774  0.1373  -0.0091  0.0527
Northern  0.3547  0.2250  0.2588  0.2047  0.1063  0.1215
Asante  x experience  -0.0155  0.0157  -0.0127  0.0132
Fante x experience  -0.0195  0.0134  -0.0147  0.0108
Ga-Adangbe  x experience  -0.0214  0.0197  -0.0218  0.0169
Ewe x experience  -0.0171  0.0156  -0.0149  0.0126
Northern  x experience  -0.0377  0.0183  -0.0055  0.0029  -0.0256  0.0166  -0.0132  0.0043
Asante x experience
2 0.0004  0.0003  0.0002  0.0003
Fante x experience 2 0.0003  0.0003  0.0002  0.0002
Ga-Adangbe  x experience 2 0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0003
Ewe x experience 2 0.0002  0.0003  0.0002  0.0003
Northern x experience2  0.0006  0.0003  0.0002  0.0003
mother's  ed. x experience  -0.0004  0.0012  0.0005  0.0010
mother's  ed. x experience2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Worker  characteristics  yes  yes  yes  yes
Employer  characterisitcs  no  no  no  no
Employer  fixed  effects  no  no  yes  yes
Rsq.  0.3742  0.3703  0.7149  0.7136
Notes: Standard  errors corrected for heteroskedasticity  using White's (1980) procedure. *** - significant at the I percent
level, ** - significant  at the 5 percent level,  * - significant  at the 10  percent level.
33Table 9: Testing for Statistical  Discrimination  on the basis of Relatedness  and Co-
ethnicity  (dependent  variable  = log monthly  earnings  in Cedi, n = 1045)
(  Oa)  (1Oa*)  (I Ob)  (I Ob*)
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.
Constant  10.2938  0.2278  10.2801 0.2283  10.9125 0.1848 - 10.9324 0.1824
Asante  -0.1541  0.0631  -0.1529 0.0632  -0.0795 0.0591  -0.0784 0.0593
Fante  -0.1145  0.0574*  -0.1102 0.0575  -0.0591 0.0493  -0.0566 0.0493
Ga-Adangbe  -0.0513  0.0604  -0.0466 0.0606  -0.0825 0.0608  -0.0807 0.0609
Ewe  -0.0708  0.0589  -0.0687 0.0589  -0.0065 0.0531  -0.0072 0.0531
Northern  -0.1941  0.0860  -0.1828 0.0862  -0.1869 0.0830  -0.1830 0.0827
Related  to employer  0.2193  0.1583  0.1475  0.0716'  0.2561  0.1561  0.2374  0.0705
related x experience  0.0084  0.0162  0.0071  0.0144
rel x experience 2 -0.0005  0.0003  -0.0003 0.0003
Same ethnic group  0.4329  0.1243  0.4021  0.1226  "  0.3136  0.1246  0.2951  0.1246
co-ethnic  x experience  -0.0341  0.0116  -0.0335 0.0114 - -0.0296 0.0107  -0.0289 0.0107
co-ethnic  x experience 2 0.0006  0.0002  0.0006  0.0002 "  0.0005  0.0002 "  0.0005  0.0002
Years of education  -0.0012  0.0134  0.0025  0.0135  -0.0155 0.0134  -0.0160  0.0131
Years of ed. sq.  0.0040  0.0006  0.0038  0.0006  0.0045  0.0006  0.0045  0.0006
Years of experience  0.0313  0.0065 "  0,0293  0.0063  0.0426  0.0069  0.0424  0.0065
Yrs of exper sq.  -0.0003  0.0001  -0.0003 0.0001  -0.0005 0.0001  -0.0005 0.0001
Female  -0.0905  0.0504  -0.0938 0.0507  -0.0234 0.0492  -0.0228  0.0489
Married  0.0251  0.0493  0.0338  0.0494  0.0129 0.0413  0.0136  0.0416
Mother's  years of ed.  0.0082  0.0040  0.0087  0.0040  0.0045  0.0033  0.0047 0.0034
Kumasi  -0.0516  0.0628  -0.0386 0.0628
Coast  -0.2959  0.0707  -0.2824 0.0715
E-Asante  -0.0846  0.0663  -0.0842 0.0660
E-Fante  0.0567  0.0589  0.0536  0.0594
E-Ga-Adangbe  0.0211  0.0771  0.0249  0.0778
E-Ewe  -0.2196  0.0829  -0.2085 0.0832
E-Northem  -0.0316  0.1532  -0.0686 0.1556
E-Non-Ghanaian  -0.0090  0.0643  -0.0064 0.0641
Foreign  owned  -0.0970  0.0503  -0.0961 0.0506
State  owned  0.1030  0.0703  0.1101  0.0702
Capital-labour  ratio  0.0041  0.0135  0.0059  0.0134
No. of employees  0.2158  0.0212"  0.2144  0.0211-"
Rsq.  0.5076  0.5023  0.7143  0.7130
Notes: Standard errors corrected  for heteroskedasticity  using White's (1980) procedure.  *** - significant
at  the  I  percent  level,  ** - significant  at the  5  percent  level,  * - significant  at the  10 percent  level.
Specification  (10a) and (lOa*) include eight sector dummies, specifications  (lOb) and (lOb*) include
employer  fixed effects.
34Figurel: Employees'  Years of Education  by Ethnic Group
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36Appendix 1: Apprentices Earnings or Pocket Money
Table Al  contains a  series of estimated earnings or pocket money functions for
apprentices.  The dependent  variable,  log of earnings,  includes  payments  in kind in the
form of food and clothing as well as money payments. In order that those who earn
nothing  from their masters  can be included,  one is added  before  taking logs.
Apprentices  have been excluded from the sample of employees  used in the main text
because their earnings are determined  by a different process from those of fully paid
workers. The results in Table Al illustrate  this point. In none of the specifications  are
the human capital variables, education and experience significant. While this result
might simply  be reflecting  a lack of variation  in education  and age across the sample,
it might alternatively  indicate  that apprentices'  existing human  capital is not rewarded.
Several other findings are consistent with the hypothesis that apprentices are given
what they require to subsist, generally  by parents  or relatives.  When the master is also
a relative the subsistence  allowance  is captured by the survey,  while when the master
and the relatives  are distinct it is not. Further, females,  who are more likely  than males
to be living with relatives,  tend to be paid less by their masters, and apprentices  from
more educated and so potentially wealthier  family backgrounds  are paid less by their
masters (columns 4 and 5 only). Less consistent with this story is the finding that
apprentices' earnings or pocket money are partially determined by their location and
by the characteristics  of their employers  or masters.  The results in column 3 indicate
that foreign enterprises, larger enterprises, and enterprises with Ga-Adangbe rather
than Other Akan entrepreneurs pay  more, while enterprises with  non-Ghanaian
entrepreneurs pay less. Further, fully controlling for employer characteristics  using
ethnic dummies significantly increases the  R-squared. This  last result should be
treated with some caution as the sample of 294 apprentices  is distributed across 75
employers or masters so there is an average of only 4 observations per employer
dummy.
The results in column one suggest that there are ethnic earnings differentials.  Ewe's
earn significantly  more than Other Akan, Asante (p-value of 0.0005) and Ga-Adangbe
(p-value of 0.09). Asante also eam less than Fante (p-value of 0.08) and Northerners
(p-value of 0.02). However, once we take account of personal characteristics  no
37significant, unexplained earnings differential remain. After controlling for specific
employer characteristics  Fante and Ga-Adangbe  appear  to be earning significantly  less
than Other Akan. However,  these differentials  disappear once we introduce employer
fixed effects.
To sum up, we have two findings in relation  apprentices' earnings  and ethnicity.  First,
there is evidence  that being  related to ones master improves  remunerations.  However,
this could simply be due to relatives paying apprentices  pocket money and us only
capturing that pocket money when the relatives are also the employers or masters.
Second, while there is evidence of earnings or pocket money differential between
ethnic groups, this appears to be entirely due to variations in personal characteristics
and location.
38Table Al:  Earnings or Pocket Money Functions for Apprentices (Dependent variable:
log of monthly earnings, n=294)
1  2  3  4
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.
Constant  7.5098  0.8199  10.6740  1.8190  15.9791  2.6465  10.7511  0.9271
Asante  -0.6160  0.9367  -0.7531  0.7636  -0.3650  0.5285  0.1717  0.2593
Fante  0.6418  0.9889  -0.5417  0.9264  -1.1232  0.6472-  -0.1242  0.2947
Ga-Adangbe  0.1764  1.1089  -1.3398  0.9978  -1.2727  0.6561  -0.3844  0.2964
Ewe  1.7049  0.9498  -1.1219  0.9352  -1.0649  0.6887  -0.5511  0.4458
Northern  1.4609  1.1324  -0.2114  0.9973  -0.6884  0.6175  -0.1938  0.4838
Related  to employer  1.9978  0.6671  1.9778  0.6733  2.2516  0.9027
Same ethnic group  0.0357  0.4632  0.0065  0.3977  0.2655  0.2470
Years of education  -0.1202  0.2313  -0.1615  0.2412  0.0069  0.1748
Years of ed. sq.  0.0044  0.0158  0.0058  0.0141  -0.0006  0.0098
Years of experience  -0.0225  0.1674  -0.0110  0.1322  0.0597  0.1398
Yrs of exper sq.  0.0048  0.0061  -0.0013  0.0055  -0.0012  0.0054
Female  -6.6501  0.5533  -4.1578  0.9881  -0.5883  1.2325
Married  -0.0136  0.0386  -0.0535  0.0321*  -0.0137  0.0219
Kumasi  -1.2822  0.5347  -1.5174  0.8655
Coast  2.0591  0.9144--  3.4577  0.9207
E-Asante  0.4193  1.2389
E-Fante  0.2324  0.8420
E-Ga-Adangbe  1.5886  0.8049
,E-Ewe  0.2606  0.8772
E-Northern  1.9471  1.2007
E-Non-Ghanaian  -3.0889  1.8330
Foreign owned  2.2778  0.9150
Capital-labour  ratio  -0.2402  0.1621
No. of employees  1.0273  0.3310
Sector  dummies  n  n  y  n
Employer  dummies  n  n  n  y
Rsq.  0.0362  0.4659  0.6601  0.8861
Notes: Standard  errors corrected  for heteroskedasticity  using White's (1980) procedure. *** - significant  at the I
percent level, ** - significant  at the 5 percent level, * - significant  at the 10 percent level. Ethnic dummies  (p-
value) - the p-value associated with an F-test for the null hypothesis  that all the coefficients on the apprentice
ethnic dummies  are equal to zero.
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Table A2: Multinomial Logit Model for Occupational Attainment (n=1045)
1  2
Management  Clerical/Sales  Unskilled  Management  Clerical/Sales  Unskilled
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.
Years of education  0.949  0.419  0.478  0.310  -0.154 0.078  1.203 0.644  0.643  0.445  -0.223 0.134
Years of ed. sq.  -0.006  0.015  -0.003  0.012  0.005  0.005  -0.001 0.023  -0.007  0.017  0.003  0.007
Age  0.085  0.111  -0.074 0.067  -0.027 0.062  0.081  0.162  -0.087  0.089  -0.242  0.093
Age sq.  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001
Female  0.615  0.476  1.672 0.261  0.592  0.287  0.320  0.681  2.240  0.352  1.249 0.416
Married  0.360  0.485  -0.344  0.266  -0.396 0.272  0.815  0.702  -0.259  0.337  -0.386  0.385
Mothers  years of ed.  0.005  0.031  -0.003  0.022  -0.035 0.024  -0.031 0.042  -0.020  0.027  -0.055 0.032
Related  to employer  0.782  0.564  -0.142  0.422  -0.683 0.404  1.610  0.915  0.185  0.601  -1.447 0.668
Same ethnic group  0.245  0.416  0.119  0.284  -0.184 0.308  0.127  0.578  1.023  0.409  0.447  0.476
Asante  -0.124  0.487  -0.169  0.369  0.478  0.395  -0.389  0.658  -0.330  0.472  0.671  0.488
Fante  -0.270  0.430  0.284  0.308  0.082  0.340  -0.495 0.574  0.620  0.375  0.069  0.413
Ga-Adangbe  -1.191  0.501 '  -0.325  0.358  -0.267  0.390  -1.393  0.738 *  -0.015  0.442  0.116  0.476
Ewe  -1.535 0.558  -0.185 0.344  0.203  0.368  -1.921  0.753  0.157  0.427  0.039  0.474
Northern  -0.651 0.908  0.126  0.549  0.602  0.472  -0.599  1.174  -0.195 0.675  1.099 0.604
Foreign owned  0.172  0.399  0.233  0.275  -0.070  0.316
State owned  -0.718 0.571  0.339  0.401  -0.488  0.451
Kumasi  0.294  0.507  0.366  0.356  0.061  0.342
Coast  -0.974 0.544  0.081  0.385  0.097  0.372
Capital-labour  ratio  0.206  0.147  0.231  0.093  -0.060 0.090
No. of employees  0.224 0.167  -0.040 0.120  0.208  0.130
Constant  included  yes  yes
Employers  ethnicity  yes  no
Sector  dummies  yes  no
Employer  dummies  no  yes
Log likelihood  -860  -611
Pseudo Rsq.  0.284  0.491
*** - significant at the I percent  level, ** - significant at the 5 percent level, * - significant at
the 10 percent level.
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The following preliminary results are for OLS regressions, with standard errors
corrected using White's procedure, for a sample of enterprises pooled over six
years. The dependent variable in each of the estimated equations is the log of real
value added per employee.  Value added is calculated  using the survey data, then
deflated to  1991 prices using the CPI and divided by the number of employees
before  natural logs are taken. All of the equations  include the log of the real capital-
labour ratio lagged one period, the log of the number of employees lagged one
period, the log of the average years of education of the employees lagged one
period, two location dummies, dummies indicating some foreign ownership and
some state ownership, six sectoral dummies and five year dummies. The value of
the capital stock is estimated  by using data from the first year that an enterprise  was
surveyed and then adding reported investment in subsequent years to that stock.
Once again the CPI is used to deflate  the value of the capital stock and investments
to  1991 prices. Lagging each of the explanatory variables ensures that they are
predetermined.  However,  this is unlikely to fully solve all problems of endogeneity
bias as, for each enterprise,  all of these variables are correlated  over time.
The coefficient  on the capital-labour  ratio is significant  at the 1 percent level and is
fairly stable  across the  two  specifications. The  magnitude of  the  estimated
coefficients indicate that a one percent increase in the capital stock is associated
with an increase in output  of between 0.14 and 0.17 percent. The labour variable is
insignificant  in both specifications  suggesting  that returns to scale are constant.  The
coefficient on the human capital variable is significant  in both the specifications,
but varies in magnitude  depending  on whether  the ethnicity variables are included.
A one percent increase in the average level of education of the employees is
associated with between a 0.27 and a 0.50 percent increase in output.  Once we
control for ethnicity, we find evidence that Kumasi-based enterprises are more
productive  than Accra-based  ones, while enterprises  with some foreign ownership
are more productive.
To the basic model presented in column 1 we add a set of dummies capturing  the
ethnic identity  of the entrepreneurs,  the proportion  of employees  who are related  to
the entrepreneur,  the proportion  of employees  who, although  not related,  come from
41the same ethnic group as the entrepreneur,  and the proportion of his/her contacts
who come from the same ethnic group. The proportion  of employees  that are related
to the entrepreneur  the corresponding  coefficient  is significant  and positive. A ten
percentage  point increase in the proportion of relatives in the workforce increases
output by 0.07 percent. This result is particularly  striking given that the proportion
of relatives is negatively  correlated  with value added, the number  of employees,  the
capital-labour ratio,  and  the  human capital  variable, and  uncorrelated with
productivity.  However, this result must be treated with considerable  caution. The
data for this variable was collected only in the fifth wave of the GMES. In the
regressions  we have assumed that for each enterprise the proportion of relatives in
the workforce  was constant  over time and so applied the same proportion  to each of
the earlier  waves.
Table A3: Enterprise  Productivity  (Dependent  variable:  log of value
added per worker, n = 703)
1  2
Coef.  s.C.  Coef.  s.e.
Constant  10.675  0.373  9.786  0.468-'-
Capital-labour  ratio  0.137  0.028  0.169  0.028
Number  of employees  0.051  0.039  0.042  0.042
Human capital  0.274  0.147  0.503  0.144
Kumasi  0.072  0.109  0.379  0.124
Coast  -0.248  0.193  -0.263  0.203
Some  foreign  ownership  0.386  0.152  0.436  0.167
Some  state ownership  -0.020  0.310  -0.011  0.243
E-Asante  -0.307  0.149
E-Fante  0.045  0.143
E-Ga-Adangbe  0.144  0.176
E-Ewe  -0.530  0.176
E-Northern  0.971  0.278
E-Non-African  -0.228  0.257
Proportion  of related employees  0.722  0.277
Proportion  of co-ethnic  employees  -0.182  0.189
Proportion  of co-ethnic contacts  -0.383  0.157
R-squared  0.290  0.351
Notes: All standard errors reported are corrected for heteroskedasticity  using White's (1980)
procedure.  *** - significant at the  I  percent  level,  ** - significant at the 5 percent  level,  * -
significant  at the 10 percent level. All regressions  also include six sectoral dummies  and five
year dummies  as explanatory  variables.
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